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"The war drums are beating in the insurance industry camp once again, and the
banking industry is circling its wagons."I
I. INTRODUCTION
The twenty-five-year-old war2 between the banking and insurance
industries over bank insurance powers has recently culminated in courtroom
confrontations in the Fifth and the District of Columbia Circuit Courts of
Appeals. These judicial battles, initiated by the insurance industry to fend off
incursions by banks into insurance markets, draw into question two statutory
provisions granting limited insurance powers to national banks: the small-town
bank insurance powers provision3 and the incidental banking powers
provision.4 These provisions have been interpreted broadly by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)5 in favor of greater bank involvement in
the sale of insurance. The insurance industry challenges the OCC's position as
violating the expressed intent of Congress. The banking industry counters with
the claim that the statutes are ambiguous and thus subject to reasonable
interpretation by the OCC, pursuant to guidelines established by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
In deciding whether the banking or insurance position should prevail,
courts have had to determine whether Congress's intent is clear from the
language of the provisions or whether it is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant
deference to the findings of the OCC.6 The D.C. Circuit and the Fifth Circuit
I Philip C. Meyer, Banks Gird for New Fight in Congress over Insurance Powers,
BANKNG POL'YREP., Sept. 6, 1993, at 5, 5.
2 The beginning of this modem day debate was sparked by the decision of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Insurance Agents, Inc.,
399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
3 12 U.S.C. § 92 (Supp. V 1993).
4 12 U.S.C. § 24(seventh) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
5 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency was established in 1913 as a bureau
under the auspices of the Department of the Treasury for the purpose of administering laws
passed by Congress concerning national banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
6 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
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recently reached different conclusions, causing both industries to set their sights
on the Supreme Court for a final judicial resolution. In Independent Insurance
Agents of America, Inc. v. Ludwig,7 the D.C. Circuit upheld a ruling by the
Comptroller of the Currency permitting a national bank to sell general
insurance products nationwide from a branch office located in a small town. In
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. v. Carke8 (VALIC), the Fifth Circuit held
that national banks could sell insurance products only in small towns. There
had been conflicting speculation as to whether the nation's highest court would
get to hear these cases, but on June 6, 1994 the Court decided to review the
Fifth Circuit case.9 However, its decision will not likely spell the end of this
debate. Instead, we can expect the war to rage on in a different theater-
Congress.
The purpose of this Note is to explore the status of the bank insurance
powers debate as illustrated by the recent decisions of the D.C. Circuit in
Independent Insurance Agents and the Fifth Circuit in VALIC. In an attempt to
provide a thorough account of the issues involved in this debate, Part II of this
Note explores the past and present role of Congress in the conflict. Part I
analyzes the judicial treatment of the statutory provisions in dispute in
Independent Insurance Agents and VALIC. Parts IV and V analyze the judicial
resolution of these cases and present the view that Congress's intent can be
inferred from its passivity to mean contentment with the status quo. This
conclusion is used to support the proposition that deference should be paid to
the Comptroller's decisions to expand bank insurance powers.
842-43 (1984), the Supreme Court outlined a two-step analysis to be used by courts in
reviewing an administrative agency's statutory interpretation. The first question is always
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise issue. If Congress's intent is clear,
there can be no controversy because the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. "If, however, the court determines ... [that]
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at
843.
7 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
8 998 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted sub nom. Ludwig v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994).
9 VALIC, 114 S. Ct. at 2161.
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I. THE LEGISLATIVE FRONT
A. Eposition ofLaws Affecting Bank Insurance Powers
Because bank powers derive only from statute,' 0 it is first necessary to
outline some of the existing laws concerning bank insurance powers, as well as
the policy considerations underlying their enactment. Consequently, courts
must look at the statutory language and legislative history to assess Congress's
intent in order to review regulatory actions. It is clear from the courts' analysis
of the small-town exception, 12 U.S.C. § 92,11 that there are few bright lines
in discerning congressional intent. 12
The principal objectives of banking regulation traditionally have focused on
the safety and soundness of individual banks and the stability of the financial
system as a whole.' 3 Congress gave effect to these objectives when it passed
the Banking Act of 1933,14 four sections of which are referred to as the Glass-
Steagall Act,' 5 to control risks. The goals of the Glass-Steagall Act are the
maintenance of general economic stability by prohibiting unsound and
imprudent investments, and the prevention of potential conflicts of interest
between commercial and investment banking operations. 16 One of the goals of
the legislators was to ensure that banks act as impartial fiduciaries. 17 Recent
events, such as the stock market crash of October 19, 1987 and the savings and
loans crisis, have served to reinforce the belief that safety and soundness are
10 See California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362, 366 (1897); Logan County Nat'l
Bank v. Townsend, 139 U.S. 67, 73 (1891).
11 12 U.S.C. § 92 (Supp. V 1993).
12 Analytical treatment of the existing laws that relate to bank insurance powers,
including the small-town exception, is reserved for Part IV.
13 Edward L. Symons, Jr., The United States Banking System, 19 BROoK. J. INT'L L.
1, 25 (1993).14 1Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162.
15 Id. §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162, 184, 188, 189, 194 (codified as amended at,
respectively, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378, 78 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Glass-Steagall (1)
prohibits national banks from buying or selling securities for their own account, § 16, 48
Stat. at 184; (2) restricts national banks from investing in debt securities, § 20, 48 Stat. at
188; (3) bans national banks from underwriting or issuing securities, with exceptions, § 21,
48 Stat. at 189; and (4) prohibits national banks from affiliating with investment banking
firms, § 32, 48 Stat. at 194.
16 Matthew Clark & Anthony Saunders, Judicial Interpretation of Glass-Steagall: The
Need for Legislat've Action, 97 BANKING L.J 721, 725 (1980).
17 Emeric Fischer, Banking and Insurance-Should Ever the Twain Meet?, 71 NEB. L.
REV. 726, 739 (1992).
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best accomplished by extensive risk control regulation.18
Bank insurance activities, like securities activities, in recent decades have
been the subject of congressional action and extensive administrative
determinations. Any query regarding insurance must begin with a survey of the
statutes. Neither the National Bank Act of 186419 nor subsequent banking acts
specifically prohibited banks from engaging in the sale of insurance;
nonetheless it was historically accepted that national banks did not have the
power to sell or underwrite insurance.20 This view was apparently confirmed
by the passage of the 1916 amendment21 to the Federal Reserve Act, 22 in
which Congress added the small-town exception to allow national banks in
communities of 5000 people or fewer to sell any insurance, but not to
underwrite insurance.
At the time these regulatory provisions were passed, they were not tested
extensively by the banking industry because the conduct of traditional banking
functions (i.e., private and commercial lending) presented a good return with
18 See Barry A. Abbott et al., Banks and Insurance: An Update, 43 Bus. LAW. 1005,
1006 (1988).
19 National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 38 (1988)).
20 Fischer, supra note 17, at 746.
21 Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 752, 753, amended by Gan-St Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-320, § 403(b), 96 Stat. 1469, 1511.
In addition to the powers now [Sept. 7, 1916] vested by law in national banking
associations organized under the laws of the United States any such association located
and doing business in any place the population of which does not exceed five thousand
inhabitants, as shown by the last preceding decennial census, may, under such rules and
regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the agent
for any fire, life or other insurance company authorized by the authorities of the State in
which said bank is located to do business in said State, by soliciting and selling
insurance and collecting premiums on policies issued by such company; and may
receive for services so rendered such fees between the said association and the
insurance company for which it may act as agent: Provided, however, That no such
bank shall in any case assume or guarantee the payment of any premium on insurance
policies issued through its agency by its principal: And provided further, That the bank
shall not guarantee the truth of any statement made by an assured in filing his
application for insurance.
12 U.S.C. § 92 (Supp. V 1993) (first emphasis added).
22 Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.). See also United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of
Am., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2173, 2185 (1993).
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relatively low risk.23 Thus, there was no pressing need for expansion by banks
into other areas. But since the late 1960s, the financial markets have undergone
a major revolution.24 Finance companies and automobile finance companies
have displaced commercial banks as the major providers of installment credit,
pension and retirement plans have diverted vast pools of funds away from
banks to the securities markets, and prime corporate customers are increasingly
side-stepping banks by satisfying their short- and intermediate-term credit needs
by issuing commercial paper.25 The net effect for banks has been the loss of
their dominance in commercial intermediation 26 and, thus, a loss in profitability
and viability.
1. Section 1843(c)(8): The Bank Holding Company Act Provision
The banks' response to the increasing competition was an attempt to bypass
statutory limitations on their banking activities by forming bank holding
companies (BHCs).27 The Banking Act of 1933 contained some controls on
BHCs, 28 but it was not until 1956, with the enactment of the Bank Holding
Company Act (BHCA),29 that Congress decided to comprehensively regulate
the acquisition of nonbanking affiliates by BHCs. 30 Because of concerns about
the concentration of banking resources in other financial fields, Congress
placed a prohibition on BHCs and their nonbank subsidiaries against activities
of a nonbank nature, except those "of a financial, fiduciary, or insurance
nature... which the Board... has determined to be so closely related to the
business of banking or of managing or controlling banks as to be a proper
incident thereto." 31 This language was interpreted by the Federal Reserve to
allow a variety of insurance activities by BHC subsidiaries, including selling
23 Fischer, supra note 17, at 771-75.
24 Id.; see also Jonathan R. Macy, The Inevitability of Universal Banking, 19 BROOK.
J. Imhr'LL. 203, 206 (1993).
25 Fischer, supra note 17, at 771-75.
26 Id. at 775.
27 A bank holding company is an entity that controls one or more banks. THOMAS P.
FrrcH, DICrIONARY oFBANKING TERMS (Irwin Kellner et al. eds., 1990).
28 Under the Banking Act of 1933, all BHCs that were members of the Federal
Reserve were placed under federal supervision. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 19(e), 48
Stat. 162, 188, repealed in relevant part by Banking Act of 1966, July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-485, § 13(c), 80 Stat. 236, 242.
29 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
30 See Fischer, supra note 17, at 776.
31 Bank Holding Company Act § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. at 137 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988)).
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credit life, accident, and health insurance, as well as property and casualty
insurance when bundled with other credit insurance related to loans.32
The BHCA was amended in 1982 by the Garn-St Germain Act,33 which
provided that "it is not closely related to banking or managing or controlling
banks for a bank holding company to provide insurance as a principal, agent,
or broker except" as permitted in exemptions A-G of the statute.34 The
insurance industry achieved by way of this amendment a major legislative
victory, which was hailed as limiting BHC incursions into insurance activities.
The consequence of this provision was to remove some of the underwriting and
sale of insurance from the list of insurance products sold by BHCs as activities
generally considered closely related to banking. 35
Congress provided seven exemptions from the BHCA's insurance
prohibition in certain situations. 36 Three of these exemptions permit qualified
BHCs to act as or own insurance agencies,37 provided that the BHC intending
to sell insurance or acquire an insurance agency prove to the Board (1) that an
exemption applies, and (2) that the public benefits from the insurance operation
under consideration will outweigh any detrimental effects. 38 The exemption
that is of particular concern in this Note is the exemption in 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(8)(C). This provision allows BHCs or their nonbank subsidiaries in
towns with populations less than 5000 or in places that have "inadequate
insurance agency facilities" to operate insurance agencies.39 The Federal
32 Symons, supra note 13, at 34.
33 Gan-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, Title VI,
96 Stat. 1469 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)).
3 4 Id. at 1536.
35 Joyce D. Palomar, Bank Control of 71tle Insurance Companies: Perils to the Public
That Regulators Have Ignored, 44 Sw. LJ. 905, 914-15 (1990). Two exemptions to the
BHCA's insurance prohibition are grandfather clauses. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(c)(8)(D), (G)
(1988).
36 See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
37 These exemptions are §§ 1843(c)(8)(C), (F), and (G).
38 Palomar, supra note 35, at 914; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(G) (1988).
In determining whether a particular activity is a proper incident to banking or
managing or controlling banks the Board shall consider whether its performance by an
affiliate of a holding company can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the
public, such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that
outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased
or unfair competition, confficts of interests, or unsound banking practices.
Id.
39 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(C) (1988).
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Reserve4° has interpreted this provision to permit the sale of insurance in towns
of 5000 people or fewer if the BHC has a lending subsidiary in the town and
the insurance activities are conducted only in that town and the surrounding
area.41 This decision placed the Federal Reserve at odds with the Comptroller
of the Currency, which interpreted the small-town bank insurance powers
provision, 12 U.S.C. § 92, to permit the nationwide sale of insurance products
by national banks located in communities of 5000 or fewer inhabitants.
2. Section 92: The Small-Town Bank Insurance Powers Provision
Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 92, the Comptroller in 1963 granted national
banks located in large cities the power to sell insurance in towns of 5000 or
fewer if the bank has a branch in the small town.42 This power was extended in
1986 by a ruling of the Comptroller allowing small-town banks to sell
insurance outside of the community in which they are located. 43 As a result,
the Comptroller of the Currency on several occasions has authorized insurance
activities by national banks that the Federal Reserve has denied to BHCs.44
Section 92 has been the subject of much litigation in recent years. The
questions raised range from the scope of the activities it covers45 to the
40 BHCs are regulated by the Federal Reserve Board. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)-(c) (1988
& Supp. V 1993).
41 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(8)Cii) (1994).
42 12 C.F.R. § 7.7100 (1993). This ruling was originally published in 1963. Saxon v.
Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. 1968); see Roman
J. Gerber, Current Legal and Regulatory Developments, 1 NAT'L BANKING REV. 133, 137
(1963). Thereafter it was carried as 7100 of the Comptroller's Manual for National Banks
until it was codified in the Code of Federal Regulations in 1971.
43 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 366 [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986).
44 Symons, supra note 13, at 34-35.
45 Questions of scope under § 92 are inherently tied to the incidental banking powers
provision under § 24(seventh). See Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d
1295, 1301 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding annuities to be insurance and thus subject to § 92), cert.
granted sub nor. Ludwig v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994);
American Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding title
insurance to fall under the explicit language of § 92, which trumps the more general
authority of § 24(seventh)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2959 (1993); Independent Bankers
Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding credit insurance
to be incidental to the business of banking under § 24(seventh) and thus not subject to § 92),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980); Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399
F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1968) (finding incidental insurance powers to be controlled by
§ 92).
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geographic boundaries it prescribes 46 to whether the provision even exists at
all.47 The legislative history of section 92 provides little guidance for resolving
these issues. On the issue of geographic boundaries, the Fifth Circuit
determined in 1968 in Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Insurance
Agents, Inc.48 that the legislative history of section 92 clearly indicated that
Congress intended to limit the sale of insurance by national banks located in
communities of 5000 or fewer to the boundaries of that community.49 Both the
Second Circuit in American Land Title Ass'n v. Cark 5 and the Fifth Circuit
in VALJC5i recently revitalized the Saxon court's interpretation. In contrast, the
D.C. Circuit held in 1993 in Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v.
Ludwig that nothing in the history of section 92 suggested "an unambiguous
congressional intent" to restrict the geographical scope of activities conducted
by banks in small towns.52
3. Section 24(seventh): The Incidental Banking Powers Provision
On the issue of product expansion, or scope, 12 U.S.C. § 24(seventh) has
played an influential role in the interpretation of section 92. Section 24(seventh)
grants to national banks "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business of banking." 53 However, "[w]hat constitutes the
46 See Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 958 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
47 United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2173,
2179-86 (1993). Because of conflicting courts of appeals decisions regarding the existence
of § 92, the Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the provision had been
repealed in 1918 by an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act, under which it was
originally enacted in 1916. Justice Souter, writing for the Court, upheld the validity of § 92
as part of the Act that was to be preserved, not amended, in 1918. l at 2186.
48 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968). This case arose as a result of the 1963 OCC Ruling
No. 7110, which provided, "'Incidental to the powers vested in them under 12 U.S.C.
sections 24, 84, and 371, National Banks have the authority to act as agent in the issuance
of insurance which is incident to banking transactions ....'" Id. at 1012 (quoting OCC
Ruling No. 7110 (1963)). The question presented in this case was whether 12 U.S.C. § 92
impliedly prohibited national banks from carrying on the business of insurance agents in
places of more than 5000 persons. Id. at 1012-13. The court held that it did. Id. at 1012.
49 Id. at 1018.
50 968 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2959 (1993).
51 Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir. 1993),
cert. granted sub non. Ludwig v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994).
52 Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
53 12 U.S.C. § 24(seventh) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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'business of banking' for purposes of Section 24(Seventh) is not statutorily
defined." 54 Instead, its interpretation has been left to the Comptroller and the
courts. 55 The Comptroller has traditionally read section 24(seventh) broadly to
allow national banks to adapt to changes in the banking field. This flexible
approach has resulted in OCC rulings permitting national banks to engage in
credit life insurance, 56 title insurance, 57 and annuities sales58 as incidental to
the business of banking. Of these attempted bank product expansions, only the
sale of credit life insurance has been upheld by the courts. 59 Although the
Comptroller's rulings have not always been upheld by the courts, the courts
have recognized changes in the business of banking when interpreting national
bank insurance powers.60 But as far as the banking industry is concerned, mere
recognition is not enough.
4. State Legislation
Because of the difficulties banks faced in gaining federal approval of
additional insurance powers, banking organizations turned their attention to
state legislation.61 Using the language of the Gan-St Germain amendments to
12 U.S.C. § 1843,62 which limited insurance activity by BHCs, the banking
industry sought to engage in insurance activities through bank subsidiaries to
the extent permitted by the National Bank Act or the applicable state laws. 63
54 Melanie L. Fein, Despite Court Ruling, National Bank Annuity Powers Are Still
Broad, BANKNG POL'Y REP., Oct. 18, 1993, at 4, 4.
55 Id.
56 See Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1170 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (holding credit life insurance to be incidental to the business of banking and thus
a proper exercise of bank insurance powers pursuant to § 24(seventh)), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 823 (1980).
57 See American Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 1992) (not
reaching question of whether or not title insurance is incidental to the business of banking),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2959 (1993). This court criticized the Heimann ruling for "its scant
analysis of section 92 and its failure to discuss the provision's legislative history." Id.
58 See Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1993)
(finding annuities sales not to be necessary to the business of banking under § 24(seventh)
and thus subject to the geographic restrictions of § 92), cert. granted sub nom. Ludwig v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994).
59 See Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980).
60 See Fein, supra note 54, at 4.
61 Symons, supra note 13, at 35.
62 See supra notes 33-34.
63 Fischer, supra note 17, at 798.
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The Code of Federal Regulations contains a regulation promulgated in 1971
that permits BHC subsidiary state banks to own any subsidiaries allowed by
state law.64 Consequently, in those states where state-chartered banks and their
subsidiaries are authorized under state law to act as insurance agents, bank
subsidiaries of BHCs can engage in broader insurance activities than otherwise
permitted under federal law. 65 Recent legal challenges in several states have
questioned the ability of state law to be either more or less restrictive than
national legislation.66 However, there has been no definitive resolution of this
issue.
B. Competing Interests
The Owensboro National Bank case cited in the previous footnote is just
one outgrowth of the bank insurance powers dispute, but it is illustrative of the
many federal bank insurance lawsuits pending today. To summarize the
situation: banks are seeking to diversify into insurance markets; the insurance
industry responds by lobbying Congress for protective legislation; banks then
find loopholes in order to continue insurance activities; and the insurance
industry returns to Congress, demanding that the gaps be closed. Congress has
generally been very responsive to the industry's requests and has consistently
increased the limits on banks and BHCs entering into the insurance business. 67
It has done so under the guise of concern about safety and soundness
principles. 68 A review of these purported policy objectives is necessary in light
of the changes in banking technology and changing consumer needs. With
increasing consumer demand for the whole range of financial services to be
offered under one roof, many bankers are convinced that continued profitability
will come only if banks are permitted to expand into areas from which they
64 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(ii) (1994). This provision applies to operating subsidiaries
of holding company-owned state banks.
65 Symons, supra note 13, at 35.
66 See, e.g., Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Moore, 803 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Ky. 1992).
Owensboro National Bank involved three national bank subsidiaries of a holding company
seeking to enjoin the Kentucky Insurance Commissioner from prohibiting them from
conducting general insurance agency functions in small towns pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 92.
The state law was more restrictive than the national legislation. See also Richard M.
Whiting, It's Tune for a Truce in War over Bank Insurance Powers, BANKING POL'Y REP.,
Aug. 2, 1993, at 1, 14; Jeffrey Marshall, 7he Showdown over Bank Insurance Sales, U.S.
BANKER, Apr. 1994, at 50.67 Symons, supra note 13, at 36.
68 Id.
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have traditionally been restricted: securities, real estate, and insurance. 69
While all three fields are potentially lucrative, insurance presents the
easiest area of penetration with the best likelihood of success for both small and
large institutions. 70 Banks have the assets essential for success in the insurance
business: credibility with consumers, a convenient delivery system, and
acknowledged expertise in computer and payment systems. 71 Bankers argue
that they can provide insurance services more efficiently than traditional
insurance agents and without increased risk to the consumer. 72 Insurance agents
vehemently oppose such bank expansion because of concerns about competition
and bankers' inexperience and lack of knowledge about the insurance
business.7 3
The deciding forces in this debate are Congress and the federal regulators
who, as illustrated in the foregoing discussion, have come out on the side of the
insurance industry out of fear for the "safety and soundness" of bank insurance
involvement, especially insurance underwriting.74 But despite the emergence of
federal regulators as allies of the insurance agents, the banking industry has
found a friend in the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Favorable
rulings by the OCC have served to open doors for banks wishing to engage in
insurance activities. However, conflicting judicial treatment of these rulings has
prompted both industries to turn their efforts toward Congress while they await
final judicial resolution by the Supreme Court.
C. Recent Congressional Activity
Senator Christopher J. Dodd, 75 "a frequent ally of the insurance industry
in its [twenty-five year] war over bank insurance powers," has spearheaded the
69 Abbott et al., supra note 18, at 1005.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See generally id.
73 Id. at 1005.
74 Id. When banks serve as insurance agents, they are merely selling insurance
products guaranteed by an insurance principal. When banks underwrite insurance products,
however, they assume any risk as the insurer of the product. This gives rise to the use of
banks' funds to guarantee the financial support of the insurance product. When this occurs,
the potential for cross-contamination of the banking and insurance interests becomes great.
The assumption of a bad risk in either area is likely to affect the stability of the other. As a
result, Congress has enacted laws (e.g., the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933) prohibiting any
underwriting of insurance by banks in order to prevent the type of systemic collapse of the
financial sector that occurred in 1929. See generally Symons, supra note 13.
75 Senator Dodd is a Democrat from Connecticut, capital of the insurance industry.
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industry's latest push for a rollback of banks' powers. 76 Dodd, a member of
the Senate Banking Committee, proposed an amendment to a bill under the
Committee's consideration in the fall of 1993, which would repeal section 92.
The effect of this amendment would be to eliminate the small-town insurance
sales of national banks and to preclude any authority of the Comptroller to
grant new insurance powers as "incidental to banking." 77 This legislation was
tabled until the 1994 legislative session because of a failure to muster a quorum
for a vote.78 The absence of so many of the panel's members reflects the
members' uneasiness about voting on such a controversial issue. In many
respects, the failed vote is an indication that the legislators, like the courts, are
unable to resolve their differences on the issues.
The 1994 legislative session has seen even less activity with regard to bank
insurance powers than did the 1993 session. This is due in large part to the
withdrawal by Senator Dodd of his proposal. 79 Senator Dodd's decision was
influenced by the four-judge dissent in the Fifth Circuit's denial of rehearing in
the VALIC case.80 The strong dissent and the Justice Department's desire to
appeal the case led Senator Dodd to step back and hope that the Supreme Court
will clarify the status of sections 24(seventh) and 92.81
D. Summary
The statutory provisions concerning insurance powers of national banks
and BHCs82 reflect the belief that allowing banks to diversify their activities
76 Meyer, supra note 1, at 5; see Revised Senate Bank Insurance Powers and Interstate
Branching Bill Could Move, BNA BANKNG DALY, Oct. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, BNA
Library, BNABD File; see also Robert M. Garsson, Vote on Curbing Insurance Power
Stalled by Absence of Senators, AM. BANKER, Nov. 19, 1993, at 2.
77 Garsson, supra note 76; see also 12 U.S.C. § 24(seventh) (granting national banks
the power to "exercise ... all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking"). 12 U.S.C. § 92 currently grants national banks the limited power to
act as insurance agents. Without this authority, national banks would be unable to provide
insurance services. Therefore, if insurance powers are no longer part of the business of
banking, then they can also not be "incidental to the business of banking" under 12 U.S.C.
§ 24(seventh).
78 Garsson, supra note 76. A quorum is 10 of the panel's 19 members.
79 Dodd Decision on Bill Helps Banks, BANKING ATr'Y, Feb. 14, 1994, at 7, 7.
80 Id.; see Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clark [sic], 13 F.3d 833 (5th Cir. 1994),
denying reh'g to 998 F.2d 1295 (1993), cert. granted sub non. Ludwig v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994).
81 Id.; see also Decision Has Risk for Bankers: SG To Back Banks, OCC in Seeking
Valic Review, BANKING ArT'Y, Apr. 18, 1994, at 2, 2.
82 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(seventh), 92, 1843(c)(8).
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into insurance markets will create conflicts of interest and thus increase the risk
of systemic bank failure. Under pressure to raise their profitability, banking
organizations have sought relief from these provisions by requesting the
Comptroller to interpret them in light of modem banking needs. In the case of
small-town insurance sales, such relief was provided by a 1986 OCC ruling
granting small-town branches nationwide insurance agency powers.8 3
However, this ruling was challenged as contravening the intent of Congress.
The next section of this Note explores the arguments made by both the banking
and insurance industries in two of the most recent cases to expressly and
impliedly decide this issue: Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v.
Ludwig and Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. v. Clarke.
III. DIVIDED WE STAND: THE CIRcUrT COURTS SPLIT ON BANKS' POWER
TO SELL INSURANCE
A. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v. Ludwig
On July 16, 1993, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued
an opinion upholding a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency that
permitted a national bank to sell general insurance products nationwide from a
branch office located in a small town. This case, Independent Insurance Agents
of America, Inc. v. Ludwig,84 commenced in 1986 with a challenge by the
insurance industry of an OCC opinion authorizing the United States Bank of
Oregon, pursuant to section 92, to engage in general insurance activities from
its small-town branch in Banks, Oregon (population 489) without geographic
restrictions.8 5 The district court upheld the OCC decision,8 6 but the D.C.
Circuit Court reversed on the grounds that section 92, the statutory provision
underlying the OCC opinion, had been inadvertently repealed in 1918 by the
misplacement of quotation marks in the statutory text and thus was not a legal
basis for the OCC opinion.8 7 This decision resulted in an appeal to the
Supreme Court, which on June 7, 1993 held that the statute was not repealed
83 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 366, supra note 43.
84 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
85 Id. at 959.
86 National Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Clarke, 736 F. Supp. 1162 (D.D.C. 1990)
(granting the defendant's motions for summary judgment), rev'd, Independent Ins. Agents
of Am., Inc. v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. United States Nat'l
Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2173 (1993).
87 Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731, 739 (D.C. Cir.
1992), rev'd sub nom. United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2173 (1993).
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and remanded the case for a decision on the merits.88
On remand, the same judge who wrote the unusual "quotation marks
opinion" striking down the OCC ruling came out in favor of the OCC. Judge
Buckley, writing for a unanimous court, declared that judicial deference was to
be paid to the Comptroller's opinion unless it is "'so inconsistent' with a
'sufficiently clear' statutory policy as to demonstrate that 'Congress' clear
intent has been violated.'" 8 9 Accordingly, the court found that because no
unambiguous contrary intent had been expressed by Congress and because the
OCC interpretation represented a permissible construction of the statute, the
OCC ruling must be upheld.90
Insurance advocates criticize the D.C. Circuit Court's opinion for failing to
adequately consider the legislative history and purpose behind section 92. They
suggest that a more exacting analysis of the issue would have revealed that
Congress's decision to grant minimal insurance powers to national banks in
small towns was done to give struggling banks "additional sources of revenue
and [to] place them in a position where they could better compete with local
State banks and trust companies." 91 Thus, they conclude that Congress meant
to create a limited opportunity for fledgling small-town banks only.92
The insurance industry appellants in Independent Insurance Agents also put
forth two arguments based on the 1982 amendment to the Bank Holding
Company Act (BHCA), which allows any subsidiary of a bank holding
88 United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2173,
2186-87 (1993). Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court, stating,
Against the overwhelming evidence from the structure, language, and subject
matter of the 1916 Act there stands only the evidence from the Act's punctuation, too
weak to trump the rest. In this unusual case, we are convinced that the placement of the
quotation marks in the 1916 Act was a simple scrivener's error, a mistake made by
someone unfamiliar with the law's object and design. Courts, we have said, should
"disregard the punctuation, or repunctuate, if need be, to render the true meaning of the
statute." The true meaning of the 1916 Act is clear beyond question, and so we
repunctuate.
Id. at 2186 (citation omitted).
89 Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (citing Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925, 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 939 (1986)).
90 Id. at 962.
91 53 CONG. REC. 11,001 (1916) (letter from then-Comptroller, J. Skelton Wflliams, to
the Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee).
92 See Independent Ins. Agents, 997 F.2d at 960-61.
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company to sell insurance in communities with populations of 5000 or fewer.93
First, they argued that the 1982 amendment illuminates the intent of Congress,
thus rendering the statutory language of section 92 unambiguous and not
subject to the OCC's interpretation. 94 The court of appeals rejected this
argument, noting that "'[t]he two provisions were enacted over sixty-five years
apart and deal with different types of banking institutions, each subject to a
distinct set of laws and regulations administered by separate agencies.'" 95 The
court went on to state that "an act of Congress in 1982 can shed no light on the
intent of Congress in 1916."96 Contrary to the court's opinion, the Gain-St
Germain Act was a renewed attempt to limit the incursion of banks into the
insurance business. 97 Because of geographic options and available capital,
BHCs could become even greater competitors to insurance agents than are
national banks, if allowed to provide nationwide insurance services from small-
town bases.
Appellants' second argument in Independent Insurance Agents was that the
Comptroller should have considered the BHCA amendment in deciding
whether to grant the National Bank of Oregon's request to sell insurance
nationwide from its small-town branches. 98 The court of appeals rejected this
argument as well, concluding that because the Comptroller's authority is
derived solely from the National Bank Act, it was not mandatory for the
Comptroller to consider issues under the BHCA or its amendments. 99 The
D.C. Circuit's finding that section 92 was sufficiently ambiguous to uphold the
Comptroller's interpretation was tacitly challenged a month later by the Fifth
Circuit in Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. v. aarke.
B. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. v. Clarke
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided the case
of Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. v. arke °00 (VALIC) on August 26,
1993, calling into question the meaning of section 92 as it is affected by section
24.101 The facts of this case presented a different slant to the much litigated
93 See 12 U.S.C. § 1843()(8)(C) (1988).
94 Independent Ins. Agents, 997 F.2d at 962.
95 Id. (quoting trial court).
96 Id.
97 See Fischer, supra note 17, at 789; Abbott et al., supra note 18, at 1007.
98 Independent Ins. Agents, 997 F.2d at 962.
99 Id.
100 998 F.2d 1295 (1993), cert. granted sub nom. Ludwig v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994).
101 Id. at 1296.
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issue of bank insurance powers under section 92. Of concern in VALC was the
sale of annuities by national banks. As a threshold issue, the court
characterized annuities as insurance within the meaning of section 92,102 thus
banning their sale by banks except in communities of 5000 or fewer. The court
then went on to hold that section 92, which permits national banks to act as
insurance agents in towns with fewer than 5000 inhabitants, prohibits national
banks from selling insurance products in towns with populations greater than
5000.103 Lastly, the court found that the specific prohibition of bank insurance
activities in section 92 controlled over the general grant of incidental powers in
section 24.104
After determining that annuities were insurance, the court attempted to
revitalize the 1968 Fifth Circuit decision in Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of
Independent Insurance Agents, l05 which declared unlawful an OCC ruling
allowing a national bank to sell insurance in cities of over 5000 people. 1°6
Saxon has been accorded little precedential weight by other courts since
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,107 in which
the Supreme Court announced a two-step analysis for review of administrative
agencies' statutory interpretations.108 The Fifth Circuit nonetheless relied on its
earlier decision to reach the conclusion that Congress's intent with regard to
section 92 is unambiguous and as such requires a narrow interpretation of
section 24(seventh), the incidental powers provision. I0 9 The VALIC court
adopted the view of the Second Circuit in American Land Title Ass'n v.
arke"0° "that the 'maxim expressio unius est e~Jusio [sic] alterius [the
mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another], used as an aid to
construction, leads to the conclusion that Congress intended to prohibit national
banks located and doing business in towns with over 5,000 inhabitants from
engaging in the insurance agency business.'""' The VALIC court further
reasoned that if Congress had not intended to limit the grant of authority in
102 Id. at 1300. "Annuities have historically been considered insurance products
because functionally they are the mirror image of life insurance." Id. at 1301.
103 Id. at 1298.
104 Id. at 1302. "[It is a basic principle of statutory construction that 'where two
statutes conflict, the statute that addresses the matter under consideration in specific terms
controls over the one that does so in a general manner.'" Id. (citing American Land Title
Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2959 (1993)).
105 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
106 Id. at 1012.
107 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See supra note 6.
108 Whiting, supra note 66, at 14.
109 VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1298-99.
110 968 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1992).
111 VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1298 (quoting American Land itle Ass'n, 968 F.2d at 155).
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section 92 to national banks in locations with under 5000 inhabitants, it never
would have inserted the restriction on the size of the community.112
The effect of the VALIC decision is to constrain the discretion of the OCC
in allowing national banks to adjust incrementally to changing competitive and
technological developments in the insurance field. However, the court did
suggest a potential remedy for banking organizations:
We end our opinion by giving banks seeking more power than they are
currently granted under §§ 92 and 24(7) the same advice given by Judge
Homer Thomberry at the conclusion of his concurring opinion in Saxon:
"banks should look to Congress, not the Comptroller." To Judge Thomberry's
admonition we simply add, " ... . or the courts." I 13
IV. COMPARISON OF INDEPENDENTINSURANCEAGENTS OFAMERICA, INC.
V. LUDWIG AND VARIABLE ANNUrIYLIFE INSURANCE Co. V. CLARKE
Although the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Independent Insurance Agents of
America, Inc. v. Ludwig 14 and the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Variable Annuity
iDfe Insurance Co. v. larken 5 (VALIC) appear to present contrary analyses,
the two decisions are technically not in direct conflict.116 Independent
Insurance Agents concerned the sale of insurance from towns with fewer than
5000 inhabitants, whereas VALIC involved the ability of national banks to sell
insurance anywhere.' 17 However, in practical application the two decisions are
inconsistent.
In VALIC, the Fifth Circuit found that annuities are insurance products and
as such are subject to section 92's geographic restriction.1 18 The D.C. Circuit's
ruling in Independent Insurance Agents, which "upheld a ruling of the
Comptroller that national banks may sell any type of insurance-including
annuities-nationwide from small towns... could nullify the adverse effect of
the Fifth Circuit decision."11 9 The practical effect is that banks previously
112 Id. However, it can be argued that the general grant of insurance powers to banks
under § 92 increases, not curtails, the authority of banks under § 24's "incidental to
banking" clause.
113 Id. at 1303 (citation omitted).
114 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
115 998 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted sub nom. Ludwig v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994).
116 Fein, supra note 54, at 4.117Id.
118 VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1301.
119 Fein, supra note 54, at 4.
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unable to sell insurance nationwide as incidental to their banking business120
pursuant to VALIC can now do so by establishing a branch bank in a
community with a population of 5000 or fewer.
The following analysis first considers the ambiguity of the statutes and
congressional intent, then evaluates the permissibility of the OCC rulings. 121
A. Section 92
Congressional intent is often determined by looking to the legislative
history of the provisions in question, 122 but the courts of appeals are split as to
how to read the legislative history of section 92. Consequently, the process of
ascertaining whether there is ambiguity in this section is best accomplished by
reading section 92 together with sections 24(seventh) and 1843(c)(8). A
comparison of these provisions allows us to draw inferences about
congressional intent.
Section 92 provides in pertinent part that "national banking
associations ... located and doing business in any place the population of
which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants... may... act as the agent
for any fire, life or other insurance company." 123 The first question to ask with
regard to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Independent Insurance Agents is
whether the small-town restriction means only that a bank must be located in a
place with a population of under 5000 in order to sell insurance, 124 or whether
that restriction also requires that the insurance be confined to that area. If the
former is the proper interpretation, then nationwide insurance sales from small-
town branches would be permissible. This is the conclusion reached by the
D.C. Circuit in Independent Insurance Agents.
Because the language of section 92 is unclear, it is useful to look at section
1843(c)(8)(C), the only other provision to introduce the small-town limitation.
Section 1843(c)(8)(C) explicitly limits the geographic scope of insurance
activities by BHCs and their nonbank subsidiaries to communities of 5000 or
fewer. Insurance advocates herald this as an indication that Congress intended
12 0 The issue in VALIC was whether the Comptroller had properly interpreted the
incidental powers clause in § 24(seventh) to allow national banks to sell fixed and variable
annuities in light of the express grant of bank insurance powers in § 92.
121 This is the two-step analysis employed in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
122 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
123 12 U.S.C. § 92 (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
124 The implication of this interpretation would be to allow big-city branches to act as
insurance agents for their small-town branches as long as the activity is conducted out of the
small-town branch.
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section 92 to also limit national bank insurance powers to the same extent. 125
There are two reasons why this analogy cannot and should not be drawn. First,
there is a sixty-six year time span between the enactments of section 92 and
section 1843(c)(8)(C), thus precluding any possibility of a nexus between
congressional intent in 1916 and congressional intent in 1982.126 Second,
BHCs are subject to oversight by the Federal Reserve Board and not the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency. Thus, because national banks and BHCs
derive their authority from two different statutory sources and are not subject to
the same oversight, the analogy is faulty and cannot be used to prove that
section 92 limits national bank insurance powers. 127
There has been no word from Congress regarding the interpretation of
section 92 since its enactment in 1916. If one adopts a "silence as acceptance"
theory, it would appear that Congress is content with the interpretation given
this provision by the OCC and upheld by the D.C. Circuit in Independent
Insurance Agents. During the past twenty-five years section 92 has been read
more and more broadly by the OCC in an effort to help banks keep up with the
times. 128 Frequent challenges by the insurance industry have resulted in gains
and losses for both the insurance and banking industries. 129 While Congress
has apparently been dissatisfied with rulings of both the OCC and the courts,'130
it has accomplished little to clarify the situation.131 The absence of such resolve
indicates Congress's general contentment with the status quo. The unavoidable
conclusion is that the D.C. Circuit Court was correct to defer to the
Comptroller's ruling allowing nationwide insurance sales from branches in
small towns. The Comptroller's ruling was not an impermissible construction
of the statute. 132
B. Section 24(seventh)
With the allowance of nationwide bank insurance sales from small-town
125 See, e.g., Abbott et al., supra note 18, at 1023; Independent Ins. Agents of Am.,
Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
126 Independent Ins. Agents, 997 F.2d at 962.
12 7 Id.
128 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
129 This point is well illustrated by the divergent results in VALIC and Independent
Insurance Agents.
130 See Revised Senate Bank Insurance Powers and Interstate Branching Bill Could
Move, supra note 76.
131 See Garsson, supra note 76.
132 See Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
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branches under section 92, the debate over product expansion pursuant to
section 24(seventh) is fading fast. Nonetheless, an exploration of this debate is
warranted because the Supreme Court has yet to rule on section 92's small-
town clause, and it is possible that other circuits would decide the issue
differently.
Interpretation of the incidental powers clause in section 24(seventh), as it
relates to section 92, raises the question of whether insurance powers can be
implicitly derived from section 24. This issue was most recently dealt with in
VALIC. Of concern in VALIC was a decision by the Comptroller to allow
national banks to sell fixed and variable annuities as incidental to the business
of banking under section 24(seventh). The Comptroller's ruling stated that
"variable annuities bear a resemblance to mutual funds and can be viewed as
purely an investment vehicle." 133 The Comptroller later declared that annuities
are essentially financial investments that entail investment risk rather than
insurance risk.134 Despite the Comptroller's characterization of annuities as
incidental to banking, the Fifth Circuit in VALIC found that annuities are
insurance products and thus subject to the restrictions of section 92.135
The Fifth Circuit's finding can be criticized for failing to adequately
consider the arguments put forth by the Comptroller in support of using the
incidental powers clause.136 The Fifth Circuit's presumption of a clear
congressional intent with respect to section 92 led it to hastily discount the
otherwise meritorious arguments of the Comptroller. The ambiguity in dispute
here refers to the types of insurance covered by section 92. The court
concluded that the section clearly referred to all insurance not necessary to
carry on the business of banking. 137 However, the Comptroller made a
legitimate argument that even if annuities are insurance, they are not the type of
insurance to which section 92 refers. The argument is that annuities contracts,
unlike general insurance, are a specialized insurance product. Section 92
expressly covers "fire, life, and other insurance," 138 leading one to reasonably
133 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 331, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,501 (Apr. 4, 1985).
134 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 499, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 83,090 (Feb. 12, 1990).
135 VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1295.
136 Fein, supra note 54, at 5.
137 The Fifth Circuit attempted to distinguish the allowance of credit life insurance
sales by banks in Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980), as necessary to protect the lender's interest
by ensuring that a loan will be repaid even if a borrower dies. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1302.
Despite the court's acknowledgement of this exception, the analysis adopted by the court
would make questionable many national bank activities long considered to be permissible.
138 12 U.S.C. § 92 (Supp. V 1993).
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conclude that only broad forms of insurance similar to these fall under section
92. Because the language of the statute is ambiguous, interpretations such as
this one need only be reasonable to be upheld.
A final argument made in support of bank insurance powers focuses solely
on section 24(seventh), which purports to grant national banks "all such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking."139
The Fifth Circuit in VALIC failed to analyze in any depth the scope of the
incidental powers clause as it relates to the possible sale of annuities. 14°
Instead, the court focused on the existence of section 92 as a limitation to
section 24(seventh). 14 1 In so doing, the court adopted a narrow interpretation
of the incidental powers clause thought to have been cast aside by the courts
over twenty years ago. 142 Prior to the VALIC decision, the incidental powers
clause was construed to include activities that were "convenient or useful" in
connection with the performance of a bank's established activities pursuant to
its express powers. 143 The First Circuit in 1972 addressed this issue in Arnold
Tours, Inc. v. Camp, stating,
In our opinion.... a national bank's activity is authorized as an incidental
power, "necessary to carry on the business of banking," within the meaning of
12 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh, if it is convenient or useful in connection with the
139 12 U.S.C. § 24(seventh) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
140 Fein, supra note 54, at 5.
141 Id.
142Id.; see Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 431 (1st Cir. 1972)
(interpreting the "incidental" language in § 24(seventh) narrowly by tying incidental powers
to express powers and those powers convenient and useful to carrying out the business of
banking). Contra Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1170
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (employing a broad approach to the interpretation of the "incidental"
language of § 24(seventh) by looking at the "business of banking" as opposed to the express
powers enumerated in that provision), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980). In American
Insurance Ass'n v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1988), responding to appellant's
argument that a bank may engage only in those activities specifically mentioned and others
incident (i.e., convenient or useful) to the expressly authorized activities in § 24(seventh),
the court found that this argument reflected "'a narrow and artificially rigid view of both the
business of banking and the [NBA].'" Id. at 281 (citation omitted). In Securities Industry
Ass'n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990), the
Comptroller espoused a more flexible standard, arguing that the Arnold Tours test is
unnecessarily restrictive of the powers of national banks. Id. at 1048. The court agreed that
the proper test was no more restrictive than Arnold Tours and found that activities within the
bank's "incidental powers"-powers that are "convenient [and] useful" to the business of
banking-are proper exercises of the bank's powers under the National Bank Act. Id. at
1049.
143 Arnold Tours, 472 F.2d at 431.
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performance of one of the bank's established activities pursuant to its express
powers under the National Bank Act. 144
The VALIC court did not acknowledge the Arnold Tours precedent but instead
set out to interpret "necessary" narrowly. 145 The Fifth Circuit's limiting
construction of the word appears to be motivated by a desire to confine the
types of activities falling under section 24(seventh) to those considered by
Congress to be part of the business of banking when the National Bank Act
was first enacted in 1864.146 The problem with this interpretation is that the
"business of banking" is very different today than it was 130 years ago.
Like sales of credit life insurance, annuities sales are specialized insurance
activities convenient and useful in the conduct of the ordinary business of
banking. Attempts to distinguish these activities are little more than exercises in
hair-splitting and should be avoided if there is to be any coherency in the law
of bank insurance powers.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision to review VAL'C 147 provides the only hope
for any immediate resolution of these issues. 148 As one commentator recently
put it, "The Supreme Court will have before it in the Valic case the chance to
wipe off the map many rules hampering banks from selling insurance-related
products." 149 A ruling in this case will also implicitly decide the issues
regarding section 92 present in Independent Insurance Agents. Pending such a
determination by the Supreme Court, no congressional action can be
expected.150
144 Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
145 Fein, supra note 54, at 5.
146 See VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1303. "If § 24(7) had authorized banks to sell insurance
products, Congress would not have needed to add § 92 which grants national banks the
limited power to sell insurance in towns with less than 5,000 inhabitants." Id. This theory,
however, is overshadowed by the fact that § 92 gave broad, general powers quite apart
from those incidental to the "business of banking."
147 Ludwig v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994), granting cert.
to Variable Life Annuity Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1993)).
148 There has been no attempt to seek review by the Supreme Court of Independent
Insurance Agents.
149 Decision Has Risk for Bankers: SG To Back Banks, OCC in Seeking Valic Review,
supra note 82, at 1.
150 Dodd Decision on Bill Helps Banks, BANKING ATT'Y, Feb. 14, 1994, at 7.
Bank sales of uninsurable products such as mutual funds and annuities will get a
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The method of analysis that should be employed by the Court in addressing
the issues of scope with regard to sections 24(seventh) and 92 is the two-step
analysis put forth by the Court in Chevron.151 Because courts have interpreted
the permissible scope of these provisions differently, there should be a
presumption of ambiguity, or lack of clear congressional intent. Consequently,
the only issue left for the Court to determine is whether the OCC rulings in
question are permissible constructions of sections 24(seventh) and 92. If it
cannot be found that the Comptroller's interpretation was permissible, then the
Court must give deference to his expertise and sustain his rulings. The
unavoidable conclusion in both VAIUC and Independent Insurance Agents is
that the Comptroller did not give the provisions impermissible constructions.
Beyond the concerns for paying deference to decisions made by
administrative agencies, there are several policy reasons that also support the
aforementioned conclusion. First, Congress has been aware of the bank
insurance powers debate and has failed to act decisively to clear up ambiguities
in the law. Thus, one may reasonably draw the conclusion that broad
interpretation of sections 24(seventh) and 92 by the OCC are not only
sanctioned by Congress but desired. Allowing the OCC to interpret these
provisions in a reasonable fashion helps to alleviate the burden on Congress to
modernize the laws. Second, as a practical matter, a decision reversing the
Comptroller's rulings would create many problems for national banks currently
engaged in insurance activities, in particular the sale of annuities. Over the
years an intricate balance has developed between the banking and insurance
boost from the decision of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, D-Conn., to drop support of
legislation sought by the insurance agents industry that would have effectively removed
banks as strong competitors in sales of insurance products.
Dodd's "abrupt decision leaves the controversy of the statutory authority of banks
to sell annuities and insurance products up to the courts at this time," said David W.
Roderer, of'mnston & Strawn in Washington.
Roderer said he believed one factor in Dodd's decision was the "strongly worded"
dissent by four judges of the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to the court's decision
not to review its ruling Valic vs. Clarke, et aL, 92-2010, a ruling that held that Section
92 of the National Bank Act was the sole source of national bank insurance powers.
Id. Now that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to the VALIC case, the federal
regulators are "arguably relieved... of their previously perceived need to clarify the status
of annuities for the federal banking statutes." Id.
151 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-47 (1984) (forbidding a court to substitute its own interpretation of a statutory provision
for one made by a regulatory agency if Congress has not directly addressed the specific
issue).
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industries, and a decision to strike down the OCC rulings would destroy this
balance. Such a prospect would be a major setback for the banking industry in
its quest for authority to sell more products.
In the end, there can be but one conclusion: Until Congress speaks to the
contrary, the Comptroller has the authority to interpret sections 24(seventh) and
92 as he deems "necessary to carry on the business of banking," 152 so long as
his interpretation is not impermissible. Because the National Bank Act does not
define insurance, the job of arriving at a reasonable interpretation of insurance
falls to the regulator of the industry in question, the OCC. In keeping with this
duty, the Comptroller has characterized annuities as investment products and
not insurance. In addition, the scope of those annuities sales is also subject to
interpretation by the OCC. Accordingly, the Comptroller has determined that
section 92 permits nationwide sales of insurance by national banks located in
communities of 5000 people or fewer. Because neither ruling controverts the
unambiguous expressed intent of Congress, these permissible constructions of
sections 24(seventh) and 92 must be upheld.
152 See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
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